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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature ofthe Case 
This case involves a suit brought by Brent and Moura Regan ("Regan") against Jeff and 
Karen Owen ("Owen") claiming: (l) interference with express easement rights across the north 
30' of the Owen's parcel; (2) interference with an implied easement across a separate piece of 
property acquired by Owen in a tax deed sale; (3) a request to reform the Owen deed to adjust 
the north propeliy boundary to encompass the land acquired by Owen in the tax deed purchase 
and (4) a claim that Regan established a prescriptive easement across a portion of the tax 
parcel. Rpp. 14-22. 
B. Course of the Proceedings 
On March 11, 2011, Regan filed a verified complaint claiming easement rights for four 
separate parcels of property owned by Regan. AR pp. 14-70. I On April 19, 2011, Owen filed 
an Answer. ARpp.71-75. 
On September 1,2011, Regan filed a motion for partial summary judgment, with 
supporting affidavits and memorandum, to declare the existence of the express easement across 
the Owen parcel and the right to develop it for road and utility purposes for the benefit of all 
parcels named in the complaint. AR pp. 142-162. The Owens filed a response to the Regans' 
motion on September 15, 2011, acknowledging that Parcel II described in the complaint was 
benefitted by the express easement. AR pp. 163-171. The court entered an Order on 
September 29,2011, granting the Regans' motion to establish and use the express easement 
without hindrance for the benefit of Parcel II. R pp. 76-80. 
1 The Clerk's Record on appeal did not include the entire clerk's record as requested. A motion 
to augment the record was submitted to cure this defect. The reference to "AR" in this brief is 
to the Augmented Record submitted and the Bates Numbers included in the Augmented Record 
submitted. 
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On October 27,2011, the Regans filed a Motion for a preliminary injunction and for a 
finding of contempt against the Owens, together with supporting affidavits and a notice of 
hearing of the contempt charge (which did not comply with I.R.C.P. 75). AR pp. 172-215. On 
November 3,2011, Owen requested an enlargement of time to file objection to the preliminary 
injunction. AR pp. 216-217. On November 4, 2011, Owen filed its opposition to the 
preliminary injunction request and supporting affidavits. AR pp. 218-268. On December 7, 
2011, Regan filed a supplemental supporting affidavits and a reply brief. AR 269-323. On 
December 13,2012, Owen filed a notice of election to cross examine Regan's affiants. AR pp. 
324-325. 
On March 16, 2012, Owen filed a motion for leave to amend their pleadings to add a 
counterclaim for trespass based upon Regan dumping construction debris outside the 
boundaries of the easement onto their property. AR pp. 326-336. On March 16,2012, the 
clerk inadvertently filed the counterclaim attached to the motion. AR pp.81-84. 
On March 28,2012, Owen filed a motion for relief from the pre-trial order to allow for 
a summary judgment motion outside the dates allowed in the Court's scheduling order. AR pp. 
333-336. On March 28, 2012, Owen filed a motion for summary jUdgment with supporting 
affidavits. AR 339-364. The court denied the motion for relief from the pretrial order and did 
not consider the motion for summary judgment because the parties were on the edge of trial. 
AR 5,3129/2012 Motion Tr p. 13. 
On May 14, 2012, Owen filed a motion in limine to preclude certain witnesses not 
previously disclosed by Regan from testifying, together with a supporting affidavit. AR pp. 
365-382. Regan opposed the motion and moved for relief from the pre-trial scheduling order to 
allow Regan to serve supplemental discovery to name new witnesses. AR pp. 388-399. Regan 
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also filed a motion to continue the May 31,2012 trial. The trial court granted the motion on 
May 25, 2012 and continued the trial. R p. 8, April 25, 2012 Transcript labeled "Motion to 
Compel". The Order related to these motions was entered June 20, 2012. R pp. 402-403. 
On May 30,2012 Owen again filed another notice of election to cross examine Regan's 
affiants at preliminary hearing. AR 400-401. On May 31, 2012 a preliminary hearing was 
commenced. May 31, 2012 Preliminary Hearing Tr. The preliminary hearing was reconvened 
on June 4,2012. June 4, 2012 Preliminary Hearing Tr. The trial court issued its preliminary 
injunction order on June 19,2012. R pp. 92-94. 
On August 14, 2012, Regan filed a second motion for summary judgment, together with 
supporting briefs and affidavits. AR pp. 404-528. On August 30,2012, Owen filed their 
opposition brief and affidavits. AR pp. 531-601. Regan filed their reply brief on September 6, 
2012. AR pp. 638-646. 
On August 16,2012, Owen moved for leave to amend their affirmative defenses to 
include the statute oflimitations defense for mistake, found at I.e. § 5-218(4). 
On September 4,2012, Owen filed their second motion for summary judgment. AR pp. 
546-637. Owen filed their brief and affidavits in opposition to Owen's motion on September 
18,2012. AR pp. 647-673. On September 25,2012, Owen sought an enlargement of time to 
file their reply brief. The reply brief was filed September 27,2012. AR pp. 676-685. On 
November 7 2012, the trial court issued its opinion on both motions. R pp. 95-112. 
On November 21,2012, Owen filed a notice of acceptance of Regan's Rule 68 offer of 
judgment on the trespass counterclaim. R. pp. 113-115. On November 29,2012, to clear up 
procedural irregularities in the filing of the trespass claim, an order granting leave to file the 
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claim was entered. R pp. 116-117. A signed counterclaim was filed November 29,2012. R 
pp.118-123. 
On January 23,2013, the parties stipulated to the dismissal of contempt claims brought 
by both parties. AR pp. 686-687. On February 17,2013, an order was entered dismissing both 
parties' motions for contempt and releasing the cash deposit posted by Regan in connection 
with the preliminary injunction. AR pp. 688-689. 
On February 7, 2013, a final judgment was entered. R pp. 124-128. A notice of appeal 
was filed March 21,2013. R pp. 129-132. 
C. Concise Statement of Facts 
This case involves propeliy situated in Sections 27 and 34 of Township 50 North, 
Range 3 West Boise Meridian, Kootenai County, Idaho. Section 27 lies immediately north of 
Section 34. The following statement provides facts regarding the various relevant parcels and 
the facts about the access road. 
1. Common Grantor 
On July 24, 1978, BAR-ACH, Inc. transferred title to a sizeable portion of real property 
to ACH. AR pp. 551-553. BAR-ACH, Inc. thereafter dissolved on August 2, 1978. AR p. 
549. Robert Collins subsequently passed away in 1987, and his children, Thomas Collins and 
Judy Baker were appointed as personal representatives for his estate. AR pp. 461-462. 
On June 26, 1979, a property survey which indicated it was prepared by Earl Sanders, 
working for K.A. Durtschi, was recorded as Instrument No. 810264 in Book 1, Page 186, 
Records of Kootenai County. AR p. 350. This property survey depicted a proposed 
subdivision of land creating three (3) parcels of land lying in the Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of Section 27, including a proposed 60' road on the southern boundary of 
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the subdivision and a proposed 60' cul-de-sac road within the interior ofthe subdivision. The 
survey indicated both roads were "not constructed". The alignment for the southern road was 
depicted as lying mostly south of the section line on its eastern end, and the swinging north of 
the section line from Section 34 entirely into Section 27 near the cul-de-sac. The survey 
indicated it was prepared for BAR-ACR. For ease of following the facts, the survey is included 
below and a full size copy is contained in Appendix A to this brief: 
PROPERTY SURVEY 
A PORTION OFTKE SElI4 SWl/4 SEcnON27.TSON,R3W 
KOOTENAI COUNTY,ICAHO OWNER; BAR- ACH 
JUNE 1.!919 S.CALE: 1~.\OO' 
810Z'-4 
k"~ ~;:~ 
," 
On October 27, 1986, another Record of Survey, again prepared by Earl Sanders 
working for Durtschi Engineering, was recorded as Instrument No. 1063318 in Book 5, Page 
30, Records of Kootenai County, showing a completely different subdivision of the Southwest 
Quarter of Section 27 and lots 3, 5 and 12 of the First Addition to Sunnyside in Section 28, 
immediately west of Section 27. AR p. 351. This survey indicated it was prepared for Glen E. 
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Moering.2 This property survey depicted a wholly different proposed subdivision of land than 
depicted in the 1979 property survey. Although this property survey depicted the same general 
area, it contained 6 lots, four of which were designated as Tracts 1-4. The only lot similar to 
the 1979 survey was a lot in the southeast comer of the survey. No cul-de-sac was depicted on 
the survey. This survey continued to depict the access road as a "proposed road". The survey 
showed rebar set on the Section 27 and Section 34 dividing line coincident with the comers of 
these tracts. This survey is depicted below and a full size copy is contained in Appendix B to 
this brief: 
OF SURVEY 
A PORTION OF iHE $W1/4 21. 750N, RSW B.M. e L(!TS 3.5 a 12 
IN FIRST TO SV!'HiYS/OS: ~ L.OCATf;:O IN 
5!);CTlC'lN' 28, 1S0N, R~W S,M .• f(COTENA! COUNTY. lDA1'lO 
5€prli:a,.!Ss;~ m&£; 
"'V~\y,<,t-;~ 
~. ~ f 
w-!l1.'(1. 
CJM,'1r1)..\ 
~.G\l' 
lloot '.i ~"<t-~O 
i{)r,,3J(~ 
"",,-,, 
i',r,,~":;';;;_; 
2 The district court indicated in its decision and order on appeal that this survey was prepared 
for ACH. R p. 96. However, there is nothing in the record that supports this finding. 
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On December 4, 1989, a Record of Survey prepared by Earl Sanders was recorded as 
Instrument No. 1168401 in Book 8, Page 80, Records of Kootenai County, Idaho. AR p. 360. 
This survey indicated on its face it was prepared at the request of Alexander Hargis. This 
survey is depicted below and a full size copy is contained in Appendix C to this brief. 
RECORD OF SURVEY 
<--.."..;;.:.-......-7~=" 
Q- *l' a~ ''l'.' 
~::.----
<:> n:r~r_"' .. ' .... ~>;<W'u~ .... 
• 1'i;';;'O ... ~'1l!"...f~'~;~<W~m=' 
2. Hart Parcel 
/3.1>" p~ 'iD 
vr! 
&.,,' Sv,l.r:.I'S 
.,tS- ..l I 
1;L''Y·n 
,s"' ......... J...,A;;u 
;~: 
By warranty deed recorded on March 24, 1988 as Instrument No. 1112028, Records of 
Kootenai County, ACH conveyed a parcel to Patricia Hart in the Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of Section 27. R pp. 40-42. This warranty deed reserved a 30' road 
easement on the southern and western boundary of the Hart parcel. This lot is the lot depicted 
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in both the southeast corner of both the 1979 survey and the 1986 survey. Hart has had the last 
name of Reid and Honeyman since her purchase. R pp. 40-48. 
On June 25, 1997, a record of survey was recorded on behalf of Larry and Patricia Reid 
by David Schumann as Instrument No. 1495096 in Book 19, Page 23 of a portion of the 
Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 27 and the Northeast Quarter of the 
Northwest Quarter of Section 34. AR p. 352. This survey depicted five existing parcels of 
property, including the Hart and the Owen parcel, and referenced the instrument number by 
which the parcels were created. The survey showed that the 1979 cul-de-sac concept had been 
abandoned by ACH when surrounding properties were granted. It showed the 30' easement 
across the southern portion of the Hart parcel. It also showed the 30' easement across the 
Owen parcel. The survey clearly depicted a gap, or median, between the road and utility 
easement across the Section 27 properties and the Owen easement in Section 34. The survey is 
depicted below and a full size copy is contained in Appendix D to this brief: 
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RECORD OF SURVEY 
J. 
Ii.. ) 
''a:.'. ~'" 
r 
"'.''i~, ~ .... r"'>"l. , ....... ",.. ~"''''._/'', ''''-".<1 It..' 
~~ h W'l"'''''"', '*'. ~,~~~ '. '" :>j'''-,"' •. "'.i.r '''_ 
(; 'U"/<" •• l(>'''W,''>I-!" 
".,,(l.<O';<i.~.op~_{n"U "$;; 
-.~+ 
3. Smart/Owen Parcel 
On December 28, 1988, a deed was recorded as Instrument No. 1137747 granting a 
parcel of property from ACH to Harold and W. Jean Smart, husband and wife. R pp. 30-32. 
The legal description of the parcel was contained in an incorporated Exhibit "A" and indicated 
that one of the property boundaries of the Smart parcel lay on the north line of the Northwest 
Quarter of Section 34. R p. 31. The deed reserved as easement to the Grantor for roadway and 
all utility purposes across the north 30 feet of the Smart parcel. R p. 31. 
The Purchase and Sell Agreement identified the property being purchased by Smart as 
Lot 13, Vista Estates. AR pp. 582-584. A map of the "Vista Estates" tracts showed yet another 
configuration of proposed lots for sale by ACH different than those shown in the 1979 survey 
and the 1986 survey. AR p. 586. This map showed a straight road of unspecified width 
APPELLANTS' OPENING BRIEF: 9 
passing in front of Lot 13 with no curve to the north, and curving south into Section 27 farther 
west. The only lot consistent with the 1979 and 1986 subdivisions was the Honeyman lot. An 
Addendum to the Purchase and Sale Agreement required the Seller to identify property comers 
30 days after close of escrow. AR 584. It also required the seller to "provide an access road 
from Bonnell Road, along the North boundary of Parcel 14, to a point 30 feet West of the 
Northeast comer of Parcel 13. Said road shall consist of eight inches of base rock 28 feet 
wide." AR p. 584. 
The legal description contained in Exhibit "A" was specially approved by each 
individual Grantor, including Thomas R. Collins, as demonstrated by their signatures following 
the legal description and a notation that stated "Approved" "Grantors". R p. 31. 
On December 15, 1994, a Record of Survey of the Smart parcel prepared by David 
Schumann was recorded in Book 16, Page 110 as Instrument No. 1381644, Records of 
Kootenai County. AR p. 353. This survey was commissioned on behalf of Harold Smart. The 
comers of the Smart parcel were set as part of the survey. The survey is depicted on the next 
page and a full size copy is contained in Appendix E to this brief: 
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RECORD OF SURVEY 
CRAPHfC SCALE 
'<~':-:'~<~_< ••. C+ __ ._« .... < ... _< .... ';' 
COlJNlY RECORDER 
SURVEYOR<S CERTIFI::ATlON 
Thereafter, the Smart parcel was purchased by Cheryl Anne Bower. AR pp. 458-459. 
Bower sold the property to David and Helen Hanna. AR pp. 407-408. JeffD. and Karen A. 
Owen ("Owen") purchased the ten acre parcel of property from Hanna by deed recorded 
February 11,2003 as Instrument No. 1781225 in the Northwest QUalier of Section 34. R pp. 
26-27. The northern boundary of the property was indicated in all the above deeds as being the 
section line of the Northwest Quarter of Section 34. 
4. Johnson Parcel 
Another deed was recorded on December 28, 1988 as Instrument No. 1137749, wherein 
ACH deeded a parcel to Judith Johnson located in the Northwest Quarter of Section 34, 
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immediately east of the Owen parcel and immediately south of the Southeast Quarter of the 
Southwest Quarter of Section 27. AR pp. 354-357. The legal description portion of the deed 
was again specifically approved in writing by ACH. AR p. 356. This wananty deed reserved a 
30' road easement along the northern boundary of the Johnson parcel. AR 356. 
5. Doney Parcel 
By wananty deed recorded June 5, 1989, ACH transfened a parcel in the Southwest 
Quarter of Section 27 to Robert and Deborah Doney. R p. 33-35. 
6. Marchelli ParcellRegan Parcel II 
On September 18, 1989, ACH entered into a Real Estate Contract with the Leslie Jean 
Schunemann Marchelli Trust (Marchelli) with respect to a parcel of property described by a 
metes and bounds description situated in a portion of Sections 27,28 and 34.3 R pp. 49-61. 
On March 3,1999, Marchelli deeded several parcels of property to Brent and Moura 
Regan ("Regan"). R pp. 23-25. The parcels were identified on an incorporated Exhibit "A" 
which identified them under headings designated as Parcels I, II, III and IV. Parcel I contained 
5 tracts ofland in the First Addition to Sunnyside. R pp. 24-25. Parcel II contained a metes 
and bound description ofland situated in Sections 27,28 and 34. R p. 24. Parcel II matched the 
legal description of the property granted to Marchelli by ACH. R p. 60. Parcel III was a metes 
and bounds description ofland situated in the Southwest Quarter of Section 27. R p. 24-25. 
Parcel IV was a parcel described in aliquot part situated in the Southwest Quarter of Section 27. 
3 The district court indicated that the legal description in the 1989 Real Estate Contract and the 
Wananty Deed between ACH and Marchelli sets the southern boundary of Regan's Parcel II as 
the centerline of the proposed road that is in dispute in this matter. R p. 97. This finding is 
wrong. Utilizing the 1989 survey prepared for Hargis, it is clear the Marchelli calls in this legal 
description utilized this survey. The call to the center of a road is to a county road, High View 
Drive. Further, the call is to the northern edge ofthe road, not the centerline of the road as 
indicated by the district court. 
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R p. 25. Subsequently Marchelli received a fulfillment warranty deed from ACH, which was 
recorded April 30, 1999. R pp. 62-66. 
7. Tax (Orphan) Parcel 
The deed from ACH to Marchelli left a parcel of land remaining with ACH. It is the 
median identified by Schumann in his 1997 survey. In 1999, Kootenai County assigned this 
parcel a tax number identified as 50N03W-28-7160. AR pp. 430-434. The taxes for this 
parcel were sent to Alexander Hargis for payment. Id. Payment was not made. 
On April 14, 2004, Kootenai County recorded a tax deed for Parcel # 50N03W-27-7160 
situated in Section 27 (hereafter referred to as "tax parcel") for failure of the record owner to 
pay real property taxes for the year 2000. R pp. 67-68. The deed indicated the record owners 
were ACH. R p. 67. The tax parcel is roughly triangular in shape. AR p. 361. The county tax 
deed conveying this parcel to Owen was recorded November 28,2005. R p. 245. 
On July 15, 2010, a survey of the tax parcel was recorded in Book 26, Page 405, as 
Instrument No. 2275296000, Records of Kootenai County. AR p. 361. This survey is depicted 
on the next page and a full size copy is contained in Appendix F to this brief. 
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RECORD OF SURVEY 
8. The Access Road 
An access road was developed in the proximity of the Section 27 and Section 34 line. 
When the access road was developed and how far it was developed at any given period of time 
is highly disputed in this matter. Thomas Collins, testified at the time of the sale of the Smart 
parcel that there was an existing unimproved roadway that started at the comer of Bonnell 
Road and continued westerly roughly along the centerline surveyed by Durtschi in 1979. AR p. 
462. Thomas Collins has been an attorney licensed to practice in Washington since 1968. AR 
p. 461. Collins affidavit testimony gave no indication on how far the access road extended 
west at the time of the Smart sale. On January 18, 1994, Collin prepared a letter to a local 
attorney, Bob Fasnacht, responding to concerns about fulfilling the road construction obligation 
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in the Smart sales agreement. AR p. 503. This letter indicated it was ACH's intention to 
commence work to improve the road in the spring of 1994. 
Smart similarly testified in his affidavit in 1988 there was an existing unimproved 
roadway that started at the corner of Bonnell Road and continued westerly along the northern 
boundary of the property. AR p. 436. Which of the two potential northern boundaries is not 
clarified in the affidavit (the section line or the 1979 proposed road boundary). Smart also 
testified in his affidavit that prior to making the offer, "we understood that the centerline ofthe 
existing unimproved roadway marked the northern boundary of Parcel 13." AR p. 436. Smati 
further testified when they purchased, they understood that Bar-Ach owned adjacent propeliy 
to the East and West of Parcel 13. AR p. 436. 
Fourteen days after providing this affidavit, Smart participated in a deposition. AR pp. 
539-546. In that deposition he clarified his affidavit testimony, and in some instances, 
contradicted it. 
Smart testified when they purchased the parcel, they looked at the property on their 
own, and then contacted someone about purchasing it. Harold Smart does not specifically 
recall the name of the person he contacted, but believed it was somebody by the last name of 
Kelly. AR p. 559 (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 11,11.25; p. 12, p. 13,11. 1-3). Yet in his affidavit, Smart 
was able to testify to the realtor's full name. AR p. 436. Smart indicated that Kelly was a 
realtor. AR p. 561 (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 18,11. 5-24). 
When Smart purchased the property, the property was described as "Parcel 13, Vista 
Estates". AR p. 582. Parcel 13 was depicted as part of a series of parcels of the land being 
offered for sale, as well as those that had sold. AR p. 486. Parcel 13 of Vista Estates depicted 
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a straight road along the northern boundary of Parcel 13, not a curved road as shown in the 
1979 and 1983 surveys. AR p. 586. 
Regarding any agreements reached between the parties as established by parole 
evidence outside the purchase and sale agreement, Smart does not know why he thought he 
owned to the middle of the road. AR p. 567 (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 40,11. 3-17). He does not recall 
anyone telling him that. AR p. 575 (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 72, 11. 23-25; p. 73, 11. 3-8). Smart 
believes it was an assumption he made. AR p. 575 (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 73, 11. 7-8). Smart never 
saw any development plan when purchasing the lot. AR p. 571 (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 19,11. 12-
19). Contrary to his affidavit testimony, he testified he had no knowledge of what was owned 
by his seller, nor did he see their development plans. AR p. 561 (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 19, 11. 10-
24). He never even met the developer. AR p. 561 (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 19,11.25; p. 20,11. 1-2). 
With respect to the road, Smart's deposition testimony regarding its existence and 
extension along the northern boundary is contrary to his affidavit. Smart's recollection of the 
road as it existed when he looked at the property was that it wasn't very well defined and went 
along the side of the property and ended on the side of the property. AR p. 562 (Smart Dep. Tr. 
p. 20, 11. 9-25). Smart recalls the road having been plowed out straight and being 30 or 40 feet 
wide. ARp. 562 (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 22, 11. 25; p. 23, 11.1-11). Smart recollects the topography 
as being fairly flat, but dropped away either on their property or beyond it. AR p. 563 (Smart 
Dep. Tr. p. 24, 11. 5-16). Smart does not recall the road he saw having a bend in it and there 
were no banks on the road. AR p. 563 (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 26, 11. 23-25, p. 27, 11. 1-12; p. 76, 11. 
23-25; p. 77, 11. 1-12). When the Smarts pulled off to the south side of the road onto the 
property they were purchasing, it was a flat area. AR p. 565 (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 33,11. 15-24). 
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In his affidavit, Smart testified that they hired attorney Robert Fasnacht because the 
road from Bonnell to their parcel had not been improved as promised by Bar-Ach. Smart 
testified in his affidavit that Exhibit 4 to his affidavit were true and correct copies of a letter 
Fasnacht sent to Kelly and a letter Fasnacht sent to them. AR p. 438. At deposition, in 
discussing Exhibit 4 to his affidavit filed in this matter, Smart testified he did not recall ever 
seeing the letter from attorney Robert Fasnacht to George Kelly. AR p. 571 (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 
57,11. 9-16). Smart indicated the letters weren't from his files because he had no documents. 
AR p. 571 (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 56, 11. 9-18). 
There was other evidence in the record before the trial court that indicated that there 
was a material dispute of fact regarding the existence and location of the road at the time Smart 
purchased. At the preliminary injunction in this matter, Honeyman testified she purchased her 
parcel in 1979 even though the deed was not recorded until March, 1988. 5/31112 Preliminary 
Hearing Tr p. 198,11.16-24; p. 199,11.21-23. There was no access road along her southern 
boundary. Id. She testified that an access road was constructed in the late 1980's by BAR-
ACH to approximately the east boundary of the Owen parcel to give access to give Johnson 
access. 5/31112 Preliminary Hearing Tr p. 202, 125; p. 203, 11.1-14. Hart testified the access 
road was extended west by BAR-ACH in the early 1990's to the end of her property. 5/31112 
Preliminary Hearing Tr p. 203, 11.15-25; p. 204; p. 205, 11. 1-8. 
According to the affidavit testimony of David Johnson, Judith Johnson's husband, there 
was no driveway to the Johnson parcel when the Johnson parcel was purchased. AR pp. 362-
364. ACH promised to construct a road for Johnson to use to access Bonnell Road, which lay 
to the east. Id. ACH followed through on this promise and constructed a road fronting the 
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Johnson parcel and connecting to Bonnell Road. Id This road terminated at what is now the 
east boundary of the Owen parcel. Id 
Another item of evidence that directly disputes Thomas Collins' testimony that the road 
was constructed at the time the Smart sale occurred in December 1988 is Paragraph 17 of the 
September, 1989, Marchelli Real Estate contract, which provided: 
17. Gravel Road. Seller at Seller's expense will construct a 20-foot wide gravel 
road extending from Bonnell Road westerly to a point 20 feet west of the 
southeast comer of the property described in Exhibit "B" within five (5) years 
after the date first above written. 
Rp.54-55. 
Parcel "B" described a piece of property previously granted by ACH to Robeli Doney. 
R p. 61, This parcel is now owned by Joseph and Margarita Lonam. R pp. 36-37. 
Collins testified there was no physical or topographic reason for the access road to have 
been non-contiguous. AR p. 465. The tax parcel has a sloped terrain, with an embankment near 
its north edge. AR 236,5/31/12 Preliminary Hearing Tr p. 259, 11. 8-13. Photographs of the 
tax parcel lodged on appeal demonstrate its topography, with an embankment on the south side. 
Exhibit BBB, CCC, DDD and EEE. These photographs demonstrate the elevation of the· south 
side of the tax parcel is higher than the elevation on the north side. The north side lay along the 
toe of the slope. The 1979 proposed access road appears to follow the toe of this slope and 
accounts for the swing north. 
9. Source of Mistake in the Deed 
Collins testified in his affidavit that he was "informed" that the legal description used in 
the warranty deed to Smart was provided by Kelly. AR p. 465. Collins provides no source of 
this information. Collins testified that the legal descriptions for Hart, Johnson, Doney and 
Marchelli were prepared by ACH's surveyor. AR p. 465. 
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Pioneer Title's title commitment indicated that Pioneer Title generated the legal. AR 
pp. 504-513. David English, a title officer with Pioneer Title, testified that it was his 
recollection that Pioneer Title requested the seller provide a more specific legal description and 
a hand note in the file indicated Kelly provided it. AR pp. 504-505. 
Smart recalls work on a survey being done after he returned to his home in Michigan. 
AR p. 561 (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 17,11. 18-25). Smart believes a survey was probably done to 
obtain a legal description of the property he was purchasing, but does not recall seeing the 
survey. AR p. 561 (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 17,11.24-25; p. 18,11. 1-4). Smart confirmed that the 
purchase and sale agreement required the seller to obtain a survey. AR p. 564 (Smart Dep. Tr. 
p. 28, 11. 20-25; p. 29, 11. 1-2; p. 29, 11. 9-19). The purchase and sale agreement required the 
seller to mark the property corners 30 days after close. Smart does not know if that occurred 
because he was in Michigan at that time. AR p. 564. (Smart Dep. Tr. p. 31, 11. 5-13). 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in ruling that the applicable statute of limitation had not 
ran? 
2. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment and allowing deed 
reformation? 
3. Did the district court err in holding Owen was not a bona fide purchaser? 
4. Did the district court err in failing to address the waiver and estoppels issues 
raised by Owen in opposition to Regan's second motion for summary judgment? 
5. Did the district court err in addressing the prescriptive easement claim in the 
memorandum decision on Regan's second motion for summary judgment? 
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III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
InP.O Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233, 237,159 
P.3d 870,874 (2007), this court reviewed the standard of review for summary judgment when 
no jury trial was requested and held: 
On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court's 
standard of review is the same as the standard used by the district court 
originally ruling on the motion. Intermountain Forest Management v. Louisiana 
Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 (2001). Summary judgment 
is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together 
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to ajudgment as a matter oflaw. LR.C.P. 
56(c). 
The burden of proving the absence of material facts is upon the moving party. 
Thomson v. City of Lewiston, 137 Idaho 473, 476,50 P.3d 488,491 (2002); see 
also Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 452 P.2d 362 (1969). 
The adverse party, however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials 
of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this 
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." 
LR.C.P. 56(e). The moving party is therefore entitled to a judgment when the 
nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of 
an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden 
of proof at trial. See Thomson, 137 Idaho at 476,50 P.3d at 491, Badell, 115 
Idaho at 102, 765 P.2d at 127. 
When an action, as here, will be tried before the court without ajury, the trial 
court as the trier of fact is entitled to alTive at the most probable inferences 
based upon the undisputed evidence properly before it and grant the summary 
judgment despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. Intermountain Forest 
Management, 136 Idaho at 235,31 P.3d at 923. Resolution ofthe possible 
conflict between the inferences is within the responsibilities of the fact finder. 
Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 900, 950 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1997). This Court 
exercises free review over the entire record that was before the district judge to 
determine whether either side was entitled to judgment as a matter of law and 
reviews the inferences drawn by the district judge to determine whether the 
record reasonably supports those inferences. Intermountain Forest Management, 
136 Idaho at 236,31 P.3d at 924. 
With respect to drawing probable inferences from the evidence presented when a court 
trial will be held, this Court has clarified that: 
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There is a fine line between drawing the most probable inferences and weighing 
the evidence, and this Court holds the belief that the district court should have 
allowed the case to go to trial in order to weigh the conflicting evidence and test 
the credibility of the witnesses. Capstar Radio Operating Company v.Lawrence, 
153 Idaho 411, 288, 283 P.3d 728, 733 (2012). 
FUliher, in Mickelsen v. Broadway Ford, Inc., 153 Idaho 149, 154,280 P.3d 176, 181 
(2012), this court held: 
At summary judgment, when reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion on an 
issue of fact, a judge may decide the issue as a matter oflaw. See Hayes v. Union 
Pacific R. Co., 143 Idaho 204, 208, 141 P.3d 1073, 1077 (2006). 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
This case involves a common Grantor who sold several parcels of property. Regan 
seeks to reform a neighbors' deed to include land not originally included by the Grantor in the 
neighbor's deed. These neighbors are Owen. The land that is sought to be included in the legal 
description of the Owen's deed lay north of Owen's parcel, and was subsequently purchased 
for value by Owen at a tax deed sale. The purpose of Regan's request to reform Owen's deed 
is to shift the burden of an express easement in favor of Regan across Owen's property from 
Owen's property onto the property purchased by Owen at a tax sale. 
The district court granted summary judgment to Regan in this matter holding that it was 
undisputed that it was always the intention of the original owner and the original grantee that 
the northern boundary of the Owen parcel would encompass the tax parcel subsequently 
acquired by Owen. This finding was based upon a 1979 subdivision survey containing a 
proposed alignment for an unconstructed access road. R p. 102. The trial court ignored 
Owen's claim that reformation was not an equitable remedy available to Regan due to their 
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development of the express easement across Owen's parcel in the original location of the 
easement before reformation of the deed. 
B. The district court erred in ruling the applicable statute of limitations did not 
bar the claim. 
In this case, Regan claims there was a mutual mistake made in the legal description 
contained in the December 28, 1988 deed from ACH to Smart. Assuming arguendo that there 
was a mutual mistake in 1988, the trial court erred in finding that the Regan's claim was not 
barred by the applicable statute of limitation. 
1. Regan had Standing to Bring their Claim for Deed Reformation 
based upon Mutual Mistake 
No direct privity of contract exists between Regan and Owen. "Privity is defined as a 
mutual or successive relationship to the same property rights, or such an identification in 
interest of one person with another as to represent the same legal rights." Silver Eagle Mining 
Co. v. State, 153 Idaho 176,280 P.3d 679, 683 (2012). This fact is not fatal to Regan's claim. 
"An action for reformation may be brought against those claiming under the original party to 
the instrument by privity including his or her heirs and personal representatives." 66 Am. Jur. 
2d Reformation ofInstruments § 98 (database updated September 2013): However, Regan 
obtained no greater rights to reform Owen's deed due to mutual mistake than ACH possessed. 
"The assignee of a contract is subject to the defenses which could be urged against his 
assignor." Anderton v. Waddell, 86 Idaho 220, 224,384 P.2d 675, 677 (1963). 
2. The Applicable Statute of Limitations 
The statute oflimitations for a mutual mistake in a deed is controlled by Idaho Code 5-
218(4), which provides in relevant part: 
Statutory liabilities, trespass, trover, replevin, and fraud. Within three (3) years:. 
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4. An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in 
such case not be deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved 
pmi, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake. 
The Court of Appeals discussed the application of this statute to a deed reformation case 
in Aiken v. Gill, 108 Idaho 900, 902, 702 P.2d 1360, 1362 (Ct. App.1985), holding: 
However, in applying the statute to a fraud case, our Supreme Court has held that 
"actual knowledge of the fraud will be inferred if the allegedly aggrieved party could 
have discovered it by the exercise of due diligence." Nancy Lee Mines, Inc. v. Harrison, 
95 Idaho 546,547,511 P.2d 828,829 (1973). We believe the same principle logically 
applies to causes of action based upon mistake. Accordingly, we hold that an action 
seeking relief from mistake will be time-barred under I.C. § 5-218(4) unless it is filed 
within three years after the mistake could have been discovered in the exercise of due 
diligence. Accord Black Leaf Products Co. v. Chemsico, Inc., 678 S.W.2d 827 
(Mo.App.l984); Haddad v. Boon, 609 S.W.2d 609 (Tex.Civ.App.l980). 
An issue of due diligence is one of fact, to be addressed in the first instance by the trial 
court. See Full Circle, Inc. v. Schelling, 108 Idaho 634, 701 P.2d 254 (Ct.App.1985); 
Reis v. Cox, 104 Idaho 434,660 P.2d 46 (1983). Where, as here, no finding has been 
made upon a material issue, the case must be remanded unless the record is clear and 
"yields an obvious answer to the relevant question." Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 
103 Idaho 217, 225, 646 P.2d 988, 996 (1982). 
The Missouri case cited with approval by the Court of Appeals, Black Leaf Products Co. v. 
Chemsico, Inc., held: 
The Missouri Supreme Court has stated that one is held to have discovered facts when 
he could have discovered them with the exercise of ordinary care or due diligence in the 
circumstances. Brown v. Irving-Pitt Mfg. Co., 316 Mo. 1023,292 S.W. 1023, 1025 
(Mo. 1927). Generally, a party cannot avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if he had 
the means to discover the facts giving rise to his action. Briece v. Bosso, 158 S.W.2d 
463,467 (Mo.App.l942). "There must be reasonable diligence; and the means of 
knowledge are the same thing in effect as knowledge itself." Id. 
Black Leaf Products Co. v. Chemsico, Inc., 678 S.W.2d 827, 831 (Mo.App.1984). 
3. Regan's Deed Reformation Claim is Time Barred 
The trial court erred in its analysis of this issue. Regan claims to be an aggrieved party 
by the alleged mistake committed by ACH in the course of ACH's sale of the property to 
Smart. Regan claims that the mistake has impaired his right to an express easement over the 
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tax parcel. The question presented by Owen's summary judgment motion was when, by the 
exercise of due diligence, should the alleged mistake have been discovered by ACH or Regan, 
or both. In its analysis of this issue, the trial court did not consider the actual knowledge 
known to Regan's predecessor, ACH, or the facts of which there was constructive notice. 
Generally, a party cannot avoid the bar of the statute of limitations in a deed 
reformation case if he had the means to discover the facts giving rise to his action. Briece v. 
Bosso, 158 S.W.2d 463, 467 (Mo.App.l942). The Smart deed was executed by the grantors 
between November 25, 1988 and December 8, 1988, and recorded December 28, 1988. R p. 
30-32. The legal description contained in the deed was individually reviewed by each 
individual grantor as verified by each grantor's signature separately approving the legal 
description used in Exhibit "A". R p. 31. 
The approved legal description indicated that the Smart parcel was situated in the 
Northwest quarter of Section 34 and that one of the boundaries commenced at " ... a point on 
the North line of said Northwest quarter; thence South 89 01' 48" East along the North line of 
said Northwest quarter, a distance of660.00 feet more or less ... " (Emphasis added). 
At the time this legal description was reviewed and approved by ACH, ACH had actual 
and constructive notice of the 1979 survey and the 1986 survey regarding the proposed road 
alignment. Both surveys depicted the road swinging north of the Section 34 section line into 
Section 27, and the road being joined throughout its course. And constructive and actual notice 
at the time they approved the legal description for the Smart parcel that the northern boundary 
of the Smart parcel would lie south ofthe 1979 proposed road alignment. If ACH had been 
exercising ordinary care and due diligence at the time of approving the legal description, ACH 
should have discovered the mistake in 1988 at the time the Smart deed was prepared. Thus, the 
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statute of limitations ran against ACH in 1991. Because Regan has no greater right than 
possessed by his Grantor, Regan is barred from bringing a claim to reform the deed. 
Further, by the year 1999 when Regan purchased the property, Regan had notice that 
they enjoyed the benefit of two express easements. There were plenty of records of survey that 
provided constructive notice that the tax parcel was not part of the Owen lot, that the 1979 
proposed road alignment was not consistent with the easements reserved by ACH, and that 
there might be a mistake that existed. The 1979 and 1986 proposed access road alignment 
surveys were available showing the configuration and width of the planned access road. The 
Smart deed and the Hart deed indicated the location of the easements reserved by ACH for the 
benefit of the land being purchased by Regan across the respective parcels. The 1989 survey 
commissioned by Hargis showed the boundaries ofthe land sold to Marchelli, and excluded the 
tax parcel purchased by Owen. The 1994 Smart survey showed that the northern boundary of 
the Smart parcel ended at the section 34 line. The 1997 Hart survey clearly showed the two 30' 
easements reserved by ACH were not contiguous and the easements were separated by a 
median, resulting in an access road configuration distinctly different that the 1979 proposed 
road alignment. All of this information was available to Regan at the time they purchased. In 
the exercise of ordinary care and due diligence, the mistake alleged by Regan should have been 
discovered by Regan at the time of the purchase in 1999. Thus, Regan is time barred from 
bringing the claim. 
C. The district court erroneously granted summary judgment on Reagan's deed 
reformation claim 
1. Law applicable to deed reformation 
When mutual mistake is alleged, parole evidence is admissible to show that mutual 
mistakes were made. Collins v. Parkinson, 96 Idaho 294, 296,527 P.2d 1252, 1255 (1974). A 
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claim of mutual mistake invokes the equitable jurisdiction of the court, 27 A Am.Jurold Equity 
§ 45 (2008) .... " Bolognese v. Forte, 153 Idaho 857, 862, 292 P.3d 248, 253 (2012). 
In Hughes v. Fisher, 142 Idaho 474, 480, 129 P.3d 1223, 1229 (2006), this Court 
summarized the law applicable to reformation of a deed, and held: 
In interpreting a deed, the court's goal is to carry out the real intention of the parties. 
C & G, Inc. v. Rule, 135 Idaho 763, 766, 25 P.3d 76, 79 (2001). If an instrument does 
not reflect the true intent of the parties due to mutual mistake, then reformation of that 
instrument may be the proper remedy. Bilbao v. Krettinger, 91 Idaho 69, 72-73, 415 
Pold 712, 715-16 (1966). "A mutual mistake occurs when both parties, at the time of 
contracting, share a misconception regarding a basic assumption or vital fact upon 
which the bargain is based." Hines v. Hines, 129 Idaho 847, 853, 934 P.2d 20,26 
(1997). The court acts properly in reforming the instrument to reflect the agreement the 
parties would have made but for the mistake. Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 640-41, 
671 Pold 1099, 1103-04 (CLApp. 1983). What the parties actually intended is a question 
of fact. Id. at 641, 671 Pold at 1104. The party alleging the mutual mistake has the 
burden of proving it by clear and convincing evidence. Collins v. Parkinson, 96 Idaho 
294,296, 527 P.2d 1252, 1254 (1974). 
In Chandler v. Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 772, 215 P.3d 485, 492 (2009), this Court 
expanded upon this principle and stated: 
We have held that "a court is acting properly in reforming an instrument when it 
appears from the evidence ... that the instrument does not reflect the intentions of the 
parties and that such failure is the product of a mutual mistake, a mistake on the part of 
all parties to the instrument." Collins v. Parkinson, 96 Idaho 294, 296,527 Pold 1252, 
1254 (1974). See also Belkv. Martin, 136 Idaho 652, 658, 39 P.3d 592, 598 (2001). 
However, we emphasize that when reforming an instrument, the court gives effect 
to the contract that the parties did make, but that by reason of mistake was not 
expressed in the writing executed by them. Id. (quoting Uptick Corp. v. Ahlin, 103 
Idaho 364, 372, 647 Pold 1236, 1244 (1982)). Thus, the district court is not free to 
reform the Agreement simply for the purpose of arriving at a result that is subjectively 
viewed as "fairer" to one of the parties. (Emphasis added.) 
A mistake may justify grounds for relief if it is so substantial and fundamental that it 
defeats the object of the parties and does not accurately represent the agreement of both parties. 
Belkv. Martin, 136 Idaho 652, 657, 39 P.3d 592, 597 (2001). 
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The Missouri Court of Appeals in In the Matter a/O'Brien, 600 S.W.2d 695, 697 
(Mo.App. W.D.1980) broke this standard down to essential elements holding that to satisfy the 
burden, a party seeking reformation must establish by clear and convincing evidence: (1) a 
preexisting agreement between the parties; (2) the existence of a mistake and; (3) the mutuality 
of mistake. 
2. The district court erred in weighing the evidence on Reagan's claim of 
mutual mistake and failing to draw aU inferences in the light most favorable 
to Owen 
Regan moved for summary judgment on the theory that there was a mutual mistake 
between the original sellers and buyers in the description of the northern boundary of the 
property purchased by Owen's remote predecessor in title, Smart. Regan contends that the 
parties to this transaction intended to place the northern boundary of the parcel along the center 
line of the 1979 proposed access road rather than on the section line of Section 34 as indicated 
in the deed. Regan asserts that ACH's realtor, George Kelly, caused this error by providing an 
incorrect legal description. The Plaintiffs support their theory of mutual mistake on the 
affidavits of Collins, English and Smart. 
In analyzing this issue, the district court wholly disregarded Smart's deposition 
testimony even though the deposition took place a mere 14 days following the creation of the 
affidavit. Despite the relatively short period oftime, Smart's deposition testimony was 
inconsistent with his affidavit as noted in the statement of facts. Further, there was no actual 
agreement reached regarding the northern boundary. It was not discussed between the parties. 
Nevertheless, the trial court relied exclusively on Smart's affidavit that he "understood" 
the centerline of the existing road marked his northern property line in reaching its decision. In 
determining this testimony was clear and convincing testimony of a mutual mistake, the trial 
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court ignored Smart's inconsistent deposition testimony. It was error for the trial court to do 
so. 
In Capstar Radio Operating Company v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 411, 416, 283 P.3d 728, 
733 (2012), this Court reviewed the standard for consideration of a motion for summary 
judgment when a jury trial is not requested and provided guidance regarding the trial court's 
function in drawing inferences and weighing evidence, holding: 
When an action will be tried before a court without a jury, the court may, in ruling on 
the motions for summary judgment, draw probable inferences arising from the 
undisputed evidentiary facts. Drawing probable inferences under such circumstances is 
permissible because the court, as the trier of fact, would be responsible for resolving 
conflicting inferences at trial. However, if reasonable persons could reach differing 
conclusions or draw conflicting inferences from the evidence presented, then summary 
judgment is improper. Losee v. Idaho Co., 148 Idaho 219, 222, 220 P.3d 575, 578 
(2009) (internal citations omitted) . 
. . . Although the court, as the trier of fact, may draw the most probable inferences from 
the undisputed evidence, there are enough genuine issues of material fact to warrant 
deciding the merits of the case at trial. There is a fine line between drawing the most 
probable inferences and weighing the evidence, and this Court holds the belief that the 
district court should have allowed the case to go to trial in order to weigh the conflicting 
evidence and test the credibility of the witnesses. 
The Court went on to observe that " ... the record presents multiple instances in which 
witnesses have made contradictory statements regarding material facts. For instance, Funk's 
deposition testimony is inconsistent with his affidavit testimony regarding the location and 
formation of the GTC access road. . . . Moreover, Rook's deposition testimony contradicts 
his affidavit testimony regarding Rook's knowledge of Funk's use of the easement road. 
Capstar at 418. This Court further observed: 
This presented the district court with another evidentiary conflict regarding a material 
fact of whether Funk's prior usage of the access road was apparent and continuous over 
a number of years and whether Rook had adequate knowledge to testify to that matter. 
See Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 172, 16 P.3d 263,269 (2000) (stating "it is not 
proper for the trial judge to assess the credibility of an affiant at the summary judgment 
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stage when credibility can be tested in court before the trier of fact."); Argyle v. 
Slemaker, 107 Idaho 668, 670, 691 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Ct.App.1984) (holding that even 
when the court will serve as trier of fact, credibility determinations "should not be made 
on summary judgment if credibility can be tested by testimony in court before the trier 
of fact"). Yet, here, the lower court seems to have weighed the conflicting evidence and 
judged the affiants' credibility in making a ruling on summary judgment. 
Capstar at 419. 
Further, Collins testimony relied upon by the trial court did not support an inference of 
a mutual mistake. Collins testified by affidavit that the creation of the tax parcel was 
unintentional and a mistake. However, Collins did not testify that the mistake was mutuaL 
Collins provided no testimony that the Grantors' intentions regarding the northern boundary of 
the parcel were ever discussed with Smart at the time the agreement was reached to sell the 
property. 
Collin speculated that the mistake must have been due to their realtor drafting the legal 
description because he was "informed" of this fact. Collin provides no information of who 
informed him of this fact or when. The purchase and sale agreement required the seller to 
obtain a survey of the property. The legal description utilized was a metes and bounds 
description that Collin specifically approved on the conveyance deed, which clearly indicated 
the road went to the section line, and not the middle of an existing road. Collins testifies to no 
conversations between ACH and Smart regarding the northern boundary the northern boundary. 
Thus, the reasonable inference from Collins affidavit was that any mistake made was a 
unilateral mistake. 
Finally, Collins and Smart testified in their affidavits that it was the intent of the parties 
that the northern boundary of the Smart parcel reach to the center of the "existing road". 
However, there were material disputed facts regarding the existence of the road at the time 
Smart purchased, let alone its centerline. 
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The 1979 and 1986 survey both clearly indicate the proposed access road was not 
constructed. The September, 1989 contract with Marchelli indicated the road was to be 
constructed. (This contract carries the initials in the footer of TRC, the same initials as lawyer 
Thomas R. Collins. R pp. 483-493.) The Smart purchase agreement indicates ACH has the 
responsibility of constructing the road. The testimony of neighbors Honeyman and Johnson 
indicated there was no road fronting the Smart parcel at the time Smart purchased. Jeff Owen 
testified when they purchased the road terminated at the eastern boundary of the parcel they 
purchased. 5/31112 Preliminary Hearing Tr p. 264, 11. 22-25; p. 261, 11. 1-11. Honeyman 
indicated in her testimony the access road was extended to the end of her property in the early 
1990's, after Smart's purchase, consistent with Collin's letter to Fasnacht. 
It appears the trial court attempted to dodge these material issues of disputed fact in its 
analysis. The district court indicated in its opinion that the intention was to have the boundary 
of the parcel extend to the center of the 1979 proposed access road alignment without 
addressing the testimony that it was to run to the center of the existing road. However, that is 
not the testimony given by Smart, as noted in the statement of facts. Smart indicated he 
assumed his parcel extended to the center of the existing road. Given all the material issues of 
fact that were disputed, the trial court did not properly draw the inferences it was required to 
draw, and instead weighed the evidence. 
3. Reagan failed to carry their burden of showing by clear and convincing 
evidence that there was a mutual mistake 
As noted in the statement offacts, there is much confusion and dissent on the source of 
the mistake and how it arose. Regan argued to the district court that the mistake originated 
when realtor Kelly prepared a legal metes and bounds description that did not incorporate the 
proposed 1979 access road. However, the testimony is not that Kelly, a realtor, prepared a 
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complex metes and bounds descriptions, but rather that he was the person who delivered it to 
the title company when such a description was requested. 
Pioneer Title's title officer, English, testified in his affidavit that Kelly provided the 
piece of paper to Pioneer Title that had the legal description written upon it. However, English 
did not testify that Kelly prepared the multifaceted metes and bounds legal description. 
The purchase and sale agreement required ACH to obtain a survey. Smart testified at 
the time of the purchase that ACH was obtaining a survey in connection with the purchase. 
Collins testified he was "informed" that Kelly prepared the legal description. Collins 
does not indicate who informed him of this fact or when he received such infonnation. In 
addition, Collins acknowledged in his affidavit that ACH regularly used a surveyor to prepare 
its legal descriptions. Thus, the reasonable inference was that the survey was prepared by 
ACH's regular surveyor. 
The district court found that "[t]"the weight ofthe evidence shows that it was most 
likely that the real estate agent used the wrong legal description on the one occasion that the 
real estate agent instead of the survey company was involved in drafting the legal description." 
This finding was not based upon clear and convincing evidence. 
Moreover, the trial court did not draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Owen, the 
non-moving party. The evidence is not clear or convincing that Kelly prepared the legal 
description as found by the trial court. There is a difference between physically providing an 
item and physically preparing the item provided. The mere fact that Kelly delivered the legal 
description to Pioneer Title does not provide clear and convincing evidence that Kelly prepared 
it. It was just as reasonable given the testimony received by the trial court for it to draw the 
inference that Kelly, who was just a realtor, worked with the survey company that regularly did 
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ACH's work and obtained the legal description from them and thereafter delivered it to the title 
company. 
Further, there was not clear and convincing evidence presented to the trial court that the 
mistake was mutual. The evidence before the trial court does not demonstrate any agreement 
actually reached between the parties. Collins testified to ACH's intent regarding placement of 
the northern boundary. He provided no testimony that this intent was ever discussed or relayed 
to Smart. The map of lots for sale provided to Smart at the time of the transaction did not 
indicate the lot would exist to the center line of the road. Even the 1986 survey showed tracts 
extending to the section line. 
Smart's testimony establishes that there were no discussions regarding this item with 
Kelly, the only individual with whom Smart dealt. Smart testified he made an assumption that 
his lot extended to the center of an existing road. Smart never walked the property with Kelly, 
so there was no communication of this assumption. Smart's acknowledged that the comers 
were to be marked and a survey was to be done of the property, thus raising the inference that 
at the time Smart purchased the boundaries of the property were unknown to Smart. Further, 
the existence and location of any road(s) bordering the northern boundary of the property at the 
time Smart purchased is materially disputed. Finally, when Smart had the property surveyed, 
no concern was raised that the northern boundary was improperly located, leading to the 
inference that Smart did not recognize any mistake in the placement of the northern property 
boundary. 
There certainly was not clear and convincing evidence before the district court that 
ACH and Smart "shared" a misconception about a basic assumption, since that basic 
assumption was never communicated between them. In fact, the reasonable inference from the 
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evidence to be drawn in a summary judgment proceeding was that there was no pre-existing 
agreement regarding placement of the northern boundary of the Smart parcel reached between 
the parties at the time the agreement was reached. 
D. The district court erred in finding Owen was not a bona fide purchaser. 
1. The law applicable to bona fide purchasers 
In Bailey v. Ewing, 105 Idaho 636, 641, 671 P.2d 1099, 1104 (Ct.App. 1983) the Idaho 
Court of Appeals held: 
The general rule is that reformation will not be granted if it appears such relief will 
prejUdice the rights of bona fide and innocent purchasers. See cases collected in 44 
A.L.R. 78 (1926), supplemented by 79 A.L.R.2d 1180 (1961). A purchaser must lack 
notice both of the mistake and of the true intent of the parties, in order to prevent 
reformation. Beams v. Werth, 200 Kan. 532,438 P.2d 957 (1968). Actual notice 
however is not required. Elwoodv. Stewart, 5 Wash. 736,32 P. 735 (1893). If there are 
circumstances which ought to put a party on inquiry as to ownership of property, that 
party is not considered a purchaser without notice and so cannot avoid reformation of 
the instrument. Fajen v. Powlus, 96 Idaho 625, 533 P.2d 746 (1975). Walters v. Tucker, 
308 S.W.2d 673 (Mo.1957) .... Whether a party is aware of circumstances sufficient to 
put him on inquiry is a question of fact. Pjleuger v. Hopple, 66 Idaho 152, 156 P.2d 316 
(1945). 
In order for grantors to be entitled to the reformation of a deed as between themselves 
and the grantee's successors in interest, the grantors are required to show that not only the 
original grantors but also all subsequent purchasers bought with notice of the mutual mistake in 
the original deed. 66 Am. Jur. 2d Reformation ofInstruments § 62 (Westlaw database updated 
September 2013). 
2. The trial court's analysis regarding Owen's status as a bona 
purchaser was flawed 
The court in this case was not asked in this case to reform a deed between an original 
grantor and original grantee. Rather, it was requested to reform the deed ofpurchasers who 
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were removed from the original grantee by three transactions over a 15 year period of time at 
the time of the Owen's lot parcel was purchased from Hanna. 
The trial court did not find that Owen had any actual knowledge of the alleged mistake 
in this matter which denied them status as a bona fide purchaser at the time they purchased the 
Smart parcel from Hanna in 2003. Instead, it found that Owen was not a bona fide purchaser 
because they knew at the time they purchased the tax parcel in 2005 that the northern boundary 
of their property was the section 27 line and "that no other party claimed ownership to or paid 
taxes on the Orphan Parcel." R p. 109. The trial court concluded that these two facts combined 
" ... shows that the Owens were on inquiry notice in 2005 that the conveyance by the Original 
Owners to the Smarts may have contained an erroneous legal description." This conclusion 
was based upon a misguided analysis of the facts and applicable law. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate that no other party claimed ownership of the 
tax parcel. At most, Owen was aware that someone did not pay taxes on the tax parcel and lost 
it in a tax deed process. Tax deed sales are a common occurrence. Second, section lines are 
common demarcations of property boundaries, so it was not unreasonable for Owen to believe 
that the section line was the dividing line between their property and the properties to the north. 
The mere fact that a parcel was available at a tax sale did not remove Owen's status as bona 
fide purchaser in 2003. 
More importantly, the trial court focused on the wrong purchase, the wrong period of 
time, and the wrong instrument in determining Owen's status as good faith purchasers. The 
evaluation of Owen's status as bona fide purchasers by the trial court should have measured at 
the time they purchased the Smart parcel in 2003, not when they purchased the tax parcel two 
years later. In 2003, nothing alerted Owen to the fact that a mutual mistake had been made 
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between Smart and AeH. Unlike Regan, Owen had no reason to inquire if a 1979 access road 
alignment shown on a survey of a proposed subdivision had been effectuated for the benefit of 
providing a 60' contiguous access corridor for Regan. Thus, Owen was a bona fide purchaser 
and their deed from Hanna should not have been reformed by the trial court. 
Moreover, the trial court did not discuss the status of Owen's predecessors as bona fide 
purchasers. Regan was required to show that all subsequent purchasers of the Smart parcel 
bought with notice of a mutual mistake in the original deed in order to defeat Owen's claim of 
being a good faith purchaser. There is no evidence that the successors to Smart had any 
knowledge of the alleged mistake. 
The trial court also held that even if Owen was a bona fide purchaser, there was no 
prejudice to Owen if the deed were reformed because Owen's main interest in the tax parcel 
they purchased were assertions of asthenic value. R p. 110. Asthenic relates to a medical 
condition of asthenia, which is an abnormal physical weakness or lack of energy. It is believed 
the trial court meant aesthetic in nature. 
The trial court cited no case law to support its holding that damage to aesthetic features 
does not constitute prejudice to a purchaser of land. In fact, the trial court engaged in no other 
discussion or analysis of prejudice other than to say it hadn't occurred in this case. 
Owen purchased a parcel, the title of which was unencumbered by an express 
easement.4 Therefore, Owen paid valuable consideration to own the entire bundle of property 
rights associated with that parcel. The reformation of the deed strips Owen of the value of their 
purchase without any compensation for the amount they paid to acquire the parcel. 
4 Regan has claimed a prescriptive easement across the existing access road for ingress and 
egress to his property. However, ifthere is an encroachment, it is very minor. By virtue of the 
deed reformation, the district court encumbered the entire tax parcel with an express easement 
much broader in scope than a prescriptive easement used for jogging, sporadic recreational use 
and ne short period for construction of an airplane landing strip. 
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The deed reformation leaves the tax parcel completely encumbered by an express 
easement. Owen was not compensated for the value they paid for the tax parcel. They lose 
exclusive control of the tax parcel. The trees and brush on the parcel may be removed for 
development of the road without Owen's permission. Owen may not utilize the land in any 
manner that is inconsistent with the burden of the express easement, whereas this limitation did 
not exist before reformation. In other words, Owen is prejudiced by the deed reformation. 
E. The district court erred in failing to address the issues of waiver and estoppel 
raised by Owen in opposition to Regan's second motion for summary judgment 
1. Law applicable to waiver and estoppel 
Regarding waiver, in Stoddard v. Hagadone, 147 Idaho 186, 191,207 P.3d 162, 167 
(2009), this Court held: 
"Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or 
advantage." Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731, 734, 639 P.2d 429,432 
(1981). "It is a voluntary act and implies election by a party to dispense with 
something of value or to forego some right or advantage which he might at his 
option have demanded and insisted upon." Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 Idaho 364, 
368,304 P.2d 646,649 (1956). "A party asserting waiver must have acted in 
reliance upon the waiver and altered the party's position." Hecla Mining Co. v. 
Star-Morning Mining Co., 122 Idaho 778, 782, 839 P.2d 1192, 1196 (1992). 
With respect to the issue of waiver, in Lawrence v. Hutchinson, 146 Idaho 892, 901, 
204 P.3d 532,541, our Court of Appeals held: 
Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking 
one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible 
position. McKay v. Owens, 130 Idaho 148, 152, 937 P.2d 1222, 1226 (1997) 
(quoting Rissetto v. Plumbers & Steamfitters Local 343, 94 F.3d 597, 600 (9th 
Cir.1996)). The policies underlying judicial estoppel are general considerations 
of the orderly administration of justice and regard for the dignity of judicial 
proceedings. Id. Judicial estoppel is intended to prevent a litigant from playing 
fast and loose with the courts, Heinze, 145 Idaho at 235, 178 P.3d at 600, and to 
prevent abuse of the judicial process by deliberate shifting of positions to suit 
the exigencies of a particular action, McKay 130 Idaho at 153, 937 P.2d at 1227 
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2. The trial court should have applied waiver to bar Regan's equitable claim 
for deed reformation 
In opposition to Regan's second motion for summary judgment, Owen raised waiver 
and estoppel as issues precluding the equitable remedy of deed reformation. At the outset of 
this case, Regan filed a motion for partial summary judgment with the trial court seeking a 
declaration that they had a thirty foot easement across the north 30 feet of the Owen parcel. 
AR pp. 142-162. Owen did not oppose this motion other than to clarify that the express 
easement only benefited Parcel II of the four parcels claimed in Regan's complaint. AR pp. 
163-171. Thereafter, the court entered an order granting Regan's motion for summary 
judgment declaring an express easement across Owen's parcel and declaring Regan had a right 
to use the easement for roadway and utility purposes without hindrance of obstruction from 
Owen. Rpp. 76-77. 
Thereafter, Regan proceeded to have a contractor develop the easement across the north 
30' of the Owen parcel. The work that was done consisted of grubbing and clearing the 
easement, widening it, removing at least four large trees and brush from the easement, and 
bringing in road base material. AR pp. 181,243,255,301; 5/31/12 Preliminary Hearing Tr p. 
152,11.2-19, 158,11. 9-15, 24-25; 159,11. 1-6; p. 160,11. 14-22; p. 102,1. 25, p. 163, p. 164,1. 1-
4; 178, 11. 23-25, 179-180. Regan even confessed to trespassing on Owen's land outside the 
boundaries of the easement in developing it. 
Following this election to develop the easement as called reserved in the Owen 
easement, Regan then requested that the trial court reform the Owen's deed to relocate the 
northern boundary, and thereby relocate the burden of the express easement. Owen argued to 
the trial court that Regan waived his right to seek a deed reformation by his actions taken to 
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develop the easement in its original location. Owen contended to allow Regan to reform the 
deed after removing trees and brush, widening the easement with heavy, equipment and 
importing foreign material onto the Owen parcel would be inequitable. The trial court ignored 
this issue in its decision. 
When Regan made his election of remedy in this matter, he removed his right to ask the 
court to reform the deed. It is a well known maxim of equity that one who seeks equity must 
do equity. To alter the Owen parcel to such a significant degree and then ask to have that 
privilege shifted to a new location flies in the face of that maxim. Further, Owen did not 
dispute Regan's first motion for partial summary judgment assuming he had made his election 
of remedy. Owen never anticipated that Regan would tum around after such significant 
alterations to their parcel and ask to change the location of the easement, or that the trial court 
would entertain such an inequitable request. 
Further, Regan is estopped from seeking deed reformation because he took one position 
in the first summary judgment proceeding and a completely different position in the second 
summary judgment proceeding. In the interim, he substantially developed the easement across 
the north 30' of the Owen parcel, thus placing a significant burden upon it that can't be restored 
if the deed reformation is granted. The large trees he removed are gone. The road bed he laid 
remains. Owen's property has been significantly altered. 
Regan's change in position regarding the location of the easement is exactly the type of 
shift in position that is precluded by judicial estoppel. Regan made a conscious decision to 
proceed forward with declaring his rights under the Owen deed without reformation and 
developing the easement based upon the Section 27 line delineating the northern boundary of 
the Owen parcel. Thereafter, Regan deliberately shifted his position to the detriment of Owen 
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to have the deed reformed to relocate the northern boundary. It is exactly this type of deliberate 
shifting of positions to suit the exigencies of a particular party that judicial estoppel is designed 
, 
to prevent. Thus, the trial court should have addressed this issue and held that Regan was 
judicially estopped from seeking reformation of Owen deed. 
F. The district court erred in indicating it had ruled with respect to Regan's right 
to a prescriptive easement claim 
Regan's second motion for summary judgment was limited to their deed reformation 
claim. In an unexpected tum of events, in the portion of the decision addressing findings of 
facts and course of proceedings, the trial court discussed the preliminary injunction in this 
matter and indicated "[t]he COUli, then, determined that the Regans enjoy a thirty foot 
prescriptive easement that runs along the centerline of the proposed road." R p. 99. 
This statement in an inaccurate sUlnmary of the trial cOUli's findings at the preliminary 
injunction. The preliminary injunction was not a trial on the merits pursuant to LR.C.P. 
65(a)(2). Further, the statements made by the trial court were: 
Now, at least from the evidence, though, that's been presented in this particular 
hearing, I think that the Regans have established a likelihood that they would 
prevail on their claim for a prescriptive easement. It's important to understand 
that I don't think the law recognizes that this easement does not have to be a 
daily in-and-out-of-the-property-access easement but certainly continuous in 
some form over the prescriptive period. Now, even Ms. Honeywell [sic] 
acknowledged that the trucks were traveling back and forth during 
approximately 2000, when the airport runway was being constructed. Now, that 
was a short period of time but the testimony from Mr. Regan was is that he used 
this road on a regular basis when he was constructing his runway. He used it for 
other purposes over the years to get in and out of his property from that access 
point. It's not a necessity access but it was a useful access for the purposes of 
periodic work, construction. He engaged in, I think for lack of a better term, a 
charitable exercise to allow woodcutting on his property. And so vehicles were 
traveling back and for the purposes of cutting wood on his property over the 
years. He testified that his kids utilized the property for the purposes of their 
ATV s and that he would jog on this - on this property as well. Now, the 
Owenses and Ms. Honeywell do not agree with respect to the extent with which 
the property was used over the years but the Owens, of course, were not there 
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but for the last year of the prescriptive period. And Ms. Honeywell certainly 
was there over a period of time and observed some use by Mr.-Mr. Regan. So 
I recognize that it's a relatively close call but for the purpose of this preliminary 
injunction, I'm satisfied that Mr. Regan has met his burden to establish that it 
appears now under the complaint that he's entitled to the relief with respect to 
the establishment of prescriptive easement over this access road to justify the 
issuance of a preliminary injunction that has been prayed for here. And so, on 
that basis the Court is prepared to go ahead and grant this preliminary 
injunction. 
June 4, 2012 Preliminary Hearing Tr p. 94,1. 23 - p. 96, l. 13. 
Thus, the trial court's indication in its decision that the preliminary injunction resolved 
the disputed prescriptive easement claim, or established the scope and width of the burdens is 
not accurate. In fact, Regan presented no testimony regarding 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the argument presented herein, the trial court's grant of summary judgment 
should be reversed. Owen is entitled to summary judgment based upon their status as bona fide 
purchasers and/or based upon the applicable statute oflimitations. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of October, 2013. 
JAMES, VERNON & WEEKS, P.A. 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of October, 2013, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing by the method indicated below, and addressed to all counsel 
of record as follows: 
Scott L. Poorman 
Scott L. Poorman, P.C. 
8884 North Government Way, Suite E 
P.O. ox 2871 
Hayden, ID 83835 
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FOUND 1-1/2 INCH ALUMINUM 
CAP MARKED 
N 01'26'14" E 
60,00' 
RECORD O_P SURVEY 
OF 
WEST, 
IDAHO 
PORTION OF THE NORTHWEST QUARTER 
SECTION 34, TOWNSHIP 50 NORTH, RANGE 3 
BOISE MERIDIAN, KOOTENAI COUNTY, 
____ \, S 89'07'47" E 2 676.60' (M & R2) ------------------~ 
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COUNTY RECORDER 
This mop was filed in the Kootenai County Recorder's Office 
at the request of David Schumann this f..S ~ day of 
.:J)q«t"IJt:.c 1994, al~ o'cJocK~M as 
Instrument No. /3 I? I t". f1t. ~ and duly recorded at 
Book I /.0 , Page 1/ D . of Surveys 
By: J~!tab< ... ,( ~
epuly ¢~. 00 
;;) S=fr: 
1o.::! 
9 :2 
r<) ~ 
"'. b", 
Om 
tng 
<D 
T()h:; (l"~ r ••• ". r-
SET 5/8 INCH REBAR WITH 
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MAR 2 8 2012 6 __ ----S "j" 89'22'06" E 891.72' 
"'T <MJ (R3) ------- - ----':';! TRACT 10 
LEGEND 
• - SET 1/2 INCH REBAR WITH YELLOW SURCAP 
MARKED PLS 4182 
B - FOUND 1/2 INCH REBAR WITH CAP MARKED 3814 
(M)- INDICATES FIELD MEASURMENT. 
....... - QUARTER CORNER MONUMENT AS DESCRIBED 
+ - SECTION CORNER MONUMENT AS DESCRIBED 
- - BARBED WIRE FENCE 
TRACT 9 
RECORD MAPS 
(Rl) ROS BY DURTSCHI, 1979, AT BOOK 1, PAGE 186 
(R2) ROS BY SANDERS, 1986, AT BOOK 5 , PAGE 30 
(R3) ROS BY SANDERS, 1989, AT BOOK 7, PAGE 150 
(R+) ROS BY SANDERS. 1989, AT BOOK 8, PAGE 80 
NOTE: ROAD LOCATION SHOWN ON Rl & R2 
TRACT 8 
BASIS OF BEARING 
THE BASIS OF BEARING FOR THIS MAP IS THE 
NORTH LINE OF THE NORTHWEST 1/4 OF SECTION 34, 
SHOWN AS S 89'07'47" E ON ROS FILED 
AT BOOK 5 OF SURVEYS, PAGE 30, BY 
BUD SANDERS IN OCTOBER, 1986 
GRAPHIC SCALE 
100 0 50 100 200 400 
~- ... ::, I 
... -
1 INCH 100 FEET 
TRACT 7 
BOOK 10 . :" 
CLIFFORD T. H~YES' '"8& J !&.l. ~~V\_ 
CLERK/RECORDER . D .. -, , - .... . 
SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATION 
THIS MAP CORRECTLY REPRESENTS A SURVEY PERFORMED BY ME IN ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO IN OCTOBER AND NOVEM8ER, 1994 AT THE 
REQUEST OF LARRY RUNKLE FOR HAROLD SMART. 
Exhibit 
-D 
KOOTENAI COUNTY SURVEYORS 
~ Jr. 6075 QUAIL LANE POST FALLS. IDAHO 83854 Ph. (208) 773-3628 
POST FALLS DRAFTlNC SERVICE 
111 LAUREL ,Ave. 
POST FALLS. 1D. 83854 
Ph.. (208) 773-"76 
1,\1 

N 
~ 
00 
~ 
.,~ 
/('~ 
• Oil 
__ \; l~ . :·~.:tcP 
~'f ,"':Cw .Y-::" 
o~ 
:co 
<~ 
elu. ;;::0 
0i:: Wz !:(::> 
Eii8 
, .' ,r..J :;;,,, 01 Co '" , , ",!:(tLl:;!jj ,:'-":': 
, :r;ZW <.' 'If)' n: " 
, ,,..,C?z,Q.· w!lJ . fi;~~~' • ,~~ ti:Z Ii) :c. 0 
w;;!;§;' ~ (.) Oz- olj:! 
g§!jj 552 ~5~ ~ Q; ffi ~L!JO:: 0 d...J 
f£f£ ~ 15 (.) 
( 
SCALE 
1" = 100' 
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RECORD OF SURVEY 
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1/4 SECTION 27, AND NE 1/4 
NORTH, RANGE 3 WEST, BOISE 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, IDAHO 
NW 1/4 SECTION 
MERIDIAN 
Inst. No. 1148215 
34 
'8@!l~ \q r~ COUNTY RECORDER 
This mop Was filed in the Kootenci County Recorder's Olfic.e 
at t request David Schumann this dS-~ dey of 
. .~ 199 '1, at /;?:; / o'clock -f?- M, os 
Inslr eni1No, /4 '1S2;f;L,; and dely (ecorded at 
BOOk~, Poge __ ? __ , pf Serveys. ad 
By: J-)~ ~~ 17 fee ~ bep;:;ty: f..U.sfu. 
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SCALE 1" = 20' to~fG li~g~ :: m:~~ ROAD t< UTILITY EASEMENT LONG CHORO = N 85'51'05" W 
--'- - - - --0----ROAD t< UnllTY EASEMENT N 01'08'OS' E 30.01 -'200:00-- --0-- ____ _ 
N 4' 'TI"W 
FD 2" ALUMINUM CAP 
W.RKED FOR 1/4 CORNER 
PLS 4182. SEE DETA1L ABOVE. 
S 26'E 55.70 RR TIE fENCE POST 
SOUTH 32.U NAIL IN PO\\'£R POLE 
Ii 54'W 17,30 1/2" REBAR PLS 4182 
N 00'52'13" E 28,59 _I -+
ROAD" UTIU E 0 _, _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ ' ___ _ 
NS9'07'47"YI 2676.61 TY ASE"nn '-- 06492 TO 1/4 CORN~R - _ ROAO '" UTIlITY EASEMENT t. 
m • '1" ~"".w,,~, """. "'«'W "'~, ~", " ~, "~'" - m'," 
REFERENCE MAPS 
ROS 81' DURTSCHI, lS79. eOOK 1 Of SURVEYS, PACE 185 
ROS BY SANDERS, 1986, BOOK 5 Of SUR\'eYS. PAGE 30 
ROS BY SCHUMANN, 1994, SOOK 15 OF SURVEYS, PAGE 110 
InsL No, 1137747 
o 
• p-.... + 
LEGEND 
SET 1/2" X 30" REBAR I'>ITH 
YELLOW SURCAP MARKED PLS 4!82 
fOUND MONUMENT ~S DESCR1BED 
FOUND puauc LANDS COR~ER AS OESCRI8t:Q 
Me LENGTH = 399.77 
LONG CHORD = 399,65 • 
LONG CHORD = N 86';3'35 W 
Inst. No. 1137749 
BASIS OF BEARING 
lHE BASIS OF BEAR!NG fOR THIS SURVEY IS TrlE NORTH 
UNE OF THE: NORTH\\l:ST QUARTER OF SECTION 34, SHO\\1'l 
~S S 89'07'47" E ON ROS fiLED AT BOOK 5 or SURVEYS, 
PAGE .5Q, BY BUD SA."iDERS IN OCTOBER. 1986. 
SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATE 
THIS MAP CORRECTLY REPRESENTS A SURVEY PERfORMED By 
ME IN ACCORDANCE \11TH THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN MAY, 1997, AI THE REOUEST Of LARRY AND PATRiCiA REm. 
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~ 6075 West Quail La.ne Post Fall.s, IdaM 83854 (208) 773-3628 Exhibit ~ 
352 

-..-...1 
...), ~ LL~ ~ ew~ 
d:,} t~ii5 ~ ,.C'JLL. 
"l!J~,. 0::: ,: =>.w, ~.~~, 
r t>'(j)~ 
I /) ..... ~ _ 
.. (1\ t 
\'O~ " 
,\ . 
.. 
J;' 
~ 
at; 
IO 
..:~ gu. 
u.0 Of: Wz 
!;;=>. 
~8 
I 
I 
ill 
~ 
( 
SCALE 
1" = 100' 
\ 
RECORD OF SURVEY 
PORTION 
TOWNSHIP 50 
InsL No, 1150484 
OF SE '1/4 SW 
NORTH, RANGE 3 
KOOTENAI COU 
/ ( 
I 
1 
I 
I 
I , 
1 
I 
I , 
I 
I 
SECTION 
DOISE 
d 
27 
MERI 
RUTRENCE MAPS 
DOUBLE J RANCH. 2003, BOOK J OF PLATS, PAGE 188 
BY DURTSCHI, 1979, BOOK 1 OF SURVEYS, PAGE 186 
BY DUR1SCHI, 1980, BOOK 2 OF SURVEYS, PAGE 107 
ROS BY SANDERS, 1985, SOOK 5 Of SURVEYS, PAGE 30 
ROS BY SCHUMANN, 1994-, BOOK 1& OF SURVEYS, PAGE 110 
BY SCHUMANN, 1997. BOOK 19 OF SURVEYS, PAGE. 23 
Inst. No, 1112028 
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/ 
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2.20' 
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INST. 
Inst, No, 1586858 
DEED 
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0.38 ACRE 
InsL No. 1137747 
o 
LEGEND 
1/2" X 30" REBAR V/1TH 
YEllOW SURCAP MARKED PL$ 4182 
DtMENS10N POINT 
DOUBLE J RANCH 
Inst, No, 1137749 
I 
BASIS OF BEARING 
TriE BASIS OF BEARING fOR n;IS SURVEY IS THE NORTH 
LINE Of THE NORTHV'£ST QUAR1ER Of SECTION 34, SHOWN 
AS S 89'07'47" E ON ROS FILED AT BOOK 5 OF SURVEYS, 
PAGE 30, BY BUD SANDERS IN OCTOBER, 1986. 
eock;}.CJ 'P~~ i.{OS' 
COUNTY RECORDER 
This mep wos filed (Of record in the Kootenai County Recorder's 
Office ot the request of Dovid Schumann this ' I s:..r'uoy of 
~, __ 20 JQ, 0\ L!.J..L o'clock....e. M, os 
Insirument No . .;t;l'l B~ q (POOO and duly recorded 0\ 
B~~U0.?e~, of Surveys. .lJ 
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Deputy 
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CD 
Donie! J_ EngliSh, Recorder 
PURPOSE OF SURVEY 
",r- UVAK! tK CORNER 
,/ FOUND 2" ALUMINUM CAP MARKED PLS 4182 
CP &. f INST, No, 2068383000 
SURVEYOR'S CERTIFICATE 
THIS MAP CORRECTLY REPRE5EN15 A SURVEY PERFORMED BY 
ME IN ACCORDANCE Illn; THE LAWS OF 'THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN hlAY, 2010, A1 'THE REQUEST Of J. D. OWE!<, 
D, ACAD\10\OWEN.OWG 
KOOTENAI COUNTY SURVEYORS FOUND 1/2" REBAR V/lTH 
MARKED LS 3814, OR AS "v"', V" .. _____ .. ,___ 18275 /Vest Quail Lane 
well"" ~ _ .Ie LANDS CORNER AS DESCRIBED ~ Post Falls. Idaho 83854-FOUND PUBuC I ANne; I .:..; (208) 773-3628 xhibit 
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